Sentinel Bio
sentinelbio.org · organization
Biosecurity grantmaker pooling philanthropic capital for nucleic acid synthesis screening governance and safeguards on AI-enabled biology, with the aim of making pandemics history.
Leadership
- Claire Qureshi · CEO
- Joshua Monrad · Managing Director
Team
5 people
source, Oct 2026
- Total granted
- $9,932,918
- Grants
- 48
- Average size
- $215,933
- Coverage
- 94%
- itemized by recipient
- Years active
- 2024–26
Grants over time
AI safety adjacentBiosecurity
Biggest cause areas
| AI safety adjacent | $5,938,345 | 60% | 20 |
| Biosecurity | $3,994,573 | 40% | 26 |
Biggest recipients
| RAND Corporation | $1,191,000 | 12% | 2 |
| Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security | $1,043,384 | 11% | 3 |
| Active Site | $1,006,443 | 10% | 2 |
| BioTrust | $750,000 | 8% | 1 |
| Resilience Action Network International | $700,000 | 7% | 3 |
| SecureBio | $600,000 | 6% | 1 |
| Engineering Biology Research Consortium | $555,000 | 6% | 2 |
| Fourth Eon Bio | $527,000 | 5% | 2 |
Grants made
| Date ↓ | Recipient | Via | Amount | Cause | Source | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 2026 | Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security | $574,750 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $574,750 to the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security to support a two-year Policy Fellowship focused on biotechnology governance in the European Union. We expect this fellowship to advance policy development and international engagement on AI-biosecurity issues, contributing to Sentinel Bio’s goal of strengthening global governance frameworks for emerging biotechnologies. | |
| Jul 2026 | Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security | $242,290 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $242,290 to the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (CHS) to support a one-year policy fellowship focused on AI-biosecurity intersections and nucleic acid synthesis security. We expect that this fellowship will advance policy development and engagement with key decision-makers in the U.S. and internationally, contributing to Sentinel Bio’s goals on safeguarding AI*Bio and strengthening nucleic acid synthesis governance. | |
| May 2026 | BioTrust | $750,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We have committed an initial $750,000 to incubate and launch a third-party trust infrastructure for managed access to bio-capable AI models. We hope this project can make legitimate access easy for the scientists who need these tools, and hard for anyone who would misuse them. A shared credentialing system lets a researcher prove their credentials once and carry that verification across the platforms and providers they work with, instead of repeating the same checks for every model. Over time, such a system can leverage network effects by working across providers to improve decisions and intercept misuse. The project is led by Jonas Sandbrink and Nick de Raad, working as Entrepreneurs-in-Residence at Sentinel Bio. It builds on our earlier work on systems to validate the legitimacy of life science customers and make biosecurity Know-Your-Customer (KYC) checks faster and cheaper. | |
| May 2026 | Biosecurity Event at SynBioBeta | $10,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $10,000 to support a biosecurity event at the 2026 SynBioBeta Conference. We hope this event will bring together leading experts to assess the opportunities and risks of synthetic biology and examine how sequence and customer screening must evolve in lockstep with advancing AI capabilities. | |
| May 2026 | RAND Corporation | $756,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided RAND with a gift of $756,000 to be spent at the discretion of RAND president and CEO Jason Matheny. Matheny has allocated this funding to support the RAND Center on AI, Security, and Technology and its research and analysis on U.S. biosecurity risk governance, including implementation of nucleic acid synthesis screening frameworks; advancing gene synthesis screening infrastructure such as sequences-of-concern database architecture and know-your-customer standards; strengthening EU and UK biosecurity frameworks and their interoperability with U.S. requirements; and building China-U.S. dialogue on shared norms for AI-enabled biological research governance. | |
| Mar 2026 | Nuclear Threat Initiative | $450,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Global Biological Policy program (NTI | bio) program with a $450,000 grant to support international engagement on AI-biosecurity risks and U.S. policy work on AIxBio safeguards and genomic synthesis screening. NTI brings established expertise and networks in China-U.S. Track II dialogue, and will convene exchanges on biosecurity topics including dual-use research of concern, nucleic acid synthesis safeguards, and AIxBio risks. They will also continue to convene the AIxBio Global Forum and engage U.S. Congress and policymakers on AIxBio legislation and biosecurity risk. We expect this work to increase to advance U.S. and international AIxBio and genomic synthesis governance, and to support coordination between the U.S., China, and other key actors on emerging biosecurity risks. | |
| Mar 2026 | Epoch AI | $15,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided Epoch AI with a $15,000 grant to expand their database of biological AI models with additional data annotations. Specifically, Epoch will add input and output type classifications to each of the 1,150+ models in their existing database – capturing both broad categories (such as amino acid sequences or molecular graphs) and precise data formats where available. This work builds on Epoch’s prior database releases supported by Sentinel Bio. We expect these enhanced annotations to improve the usability of the database for policymakers and researchers seeking to understand the technical landscape of biological AI tools. | |
| Mar 2026 | Engineering Biology Research Consortium | $225,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $225,000 to the Engineering Biology Research Consortium (EBRC), working with the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), to develop an auditable Know-Your-Customer (KYC) standard for nucleic acid synthesis providers. The standard will define the baseline customer information that providers must collect and verify for all orders, and at a higher bar, for orders containing sequences of concern. We hope this will create the foundation for a concrete, enforceable standard for regulators. With screening mandates under consideration in the U.S., the EU, and several other jurisdictions, the absence of a concrete, enforceable standard is one of the biggest blockers to enforceable KYC regulations. This project aims to fill that gap, producing an auditable standard designed for adoption by government authorities. This grant builds on our earlier work with the EBRC on stress-testing nucleic acid synthesis providers and complements our work with the IGSC and IBBIS on sequence screening standards. | |
| Feb 2026 | Fourth Eon Bio | $418,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $418,000 to Fourth Eon Bio to advance function-based screening in the nucleic acid synthesis industry. This includes evaluating whether AI-powered biological design tools can generate threats that evade current screening methods and developing new approaches to detect them. Fourth Eon Bio will also continue to build consensus across synthesis providers, screening tool developers, and biosecurity experts on how to standardize and deploy function-based screening. We expect their work will advance global biosecurity by improving screening quality and resilience against emerging AI capabilities. | |
| Feb 2026 | EHY Consulting | $10,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided up to $10,000 to EHY Consulting LLC to support the development of a biosecurity playbook focused on improving coordination between nucleic acid synthesis providers and law enforcement when suspicious synthetic DNA orders are identified. This coordination challenge is becoming increasingly urgent as rapid advances at the convergence of artificial intelligence and biotechnology accelerate the accessibility of biological design and synthesis. The playbook is designed to clarify roles, decision points, information flows, and escalation pathways, helping translate screening signals into real-world responses. | |
| Feb 2026 | Unknown Recipients | — | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We engaged independent contractors to support the early development of BioTrust, a proposed third-party verification system for the bioeconomy. BioTrust would function as a passport for researchers accessing dual-use biotechnology services, such as AI models, synthetic nucleic acids, and cloud labs, by centralizing identity verification and Know-Your-Customer (KYC) checks to ensure consistency across individual providers. These contractors will conduct foundational research, stakeholder outreach, and technical scoping over a 10-week exploratory period. Their goals include building an initial coalition of supporters across AI labs, synthesis providers, and academic institutions; conducting exploratory conversations with providers and university procurement offices; and developing a prototype of the verification API. | |
| Feb 2026 | Semiparametric LLC | — | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | Securing access to synthetic DNA rests on three layers: deterring bad actors from trying, denying dangerous orders through order and customer screening, and giving law enforcement the tools to detect and intercept threats. This grant supports a researcher with deep expertise in synthesis screening and national security in assessing which interventions beyond screening are most promising for strengthening nucleic acid synthesis security. | |
| Jan 2026 | Asia Centre for Health Security | $400,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $400,000 to the Asia Centre for Health Security to expand the centre’s work on biosecurity in Asia, with a particular focus on nucleic acid synthesis, AIxBio governance, and regional biosecurity capacity building. We expect this work to support progress towards implementing robust biosecurity policies across Asia’s major life science hubs and identify opportunities for reducing the risks of biotechnology accidents and misuse in Asia and beyond. | |
| Jan 2026 | Resilience Action Network International | $300,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $300,000 to Resilience Action Network International (rani) to continue their biosecurity and synthesis screening policy work in Europe. With new biosecurity policies advancing globally, we see a critical window to create strong standards for nucleic acid synthesis governance. We expect this effort to advance responsible synthesis screening policies in the EU, build a cohort of informed and engaged policymakers across Europe, and deepen understanding of this issue among industry partners and other stakeholders. | |
| Jan 2026 | SecureDNA | $60,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $60,000 to SecureDNA to support the development of a go-to-market and community outreach plan for increasing the adoption of DNA synthesis screening tools among nucleic acid providers worldwide. This grant is the first step in a potential three-phase effort; subsequent phases would execute and scale an outreach campaign based on results. We aim for this effort to support not only the freely available SecureDNA screening tool, but also other synthesis screening tools and services, as well as the broader biosecurity community. As screening policies advance globally, we expect demand for screening tools to grow significantly and view this as an opportunity to build the capacity to meet that need. We expect outreach and marketing efforts to build industry momentum that supports policymakers considering new regulations and accelerate adherence to best practices and regulatory requirements. | |
| Jan 2026 | Frontiers Media | $17,500 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided up to $17,500 to Frontiers Media to sponsor open access for articles in an upcoming Research Topic on Synthetic Nucleic Acid Technology: The Biosecurity Landscape. The Research Topic features exceptional guest editors with deep expertise and focuses on key practical implementation questions in nucleic acid synthesis screening. We expect the articles in this Research Topic to advance the global discussion around how to secure synthetic DNA and provide actionable answers to policy design questions. By making these articles open access, we expect to increase readership among policymakers, industry leaders, and researchers, and potentially attract stronger submissions from budget-constrained authors and institutions, including in the Global South. | |
| Nov 2025 | RAND Corporation | $435,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided RAND with a gift of $445,000 to be spent at the discretion of RAND president and CEO Jason Matheny. Matheny has allocated this funding to support research and analysis on creating an early warning system for dangerous capabilities in frontier AI-enabled biological design tools (BDTs); raising awareness among labs and BDT developers to drive risk mitigation efforts; improving governance of nucleic acid synthesis; and informing future biosecurity policy in Europe and globally. | |
| Oct 2025 | Active Site | $406,443 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $406,443 to fund an empirical study assessing the practical barriers to nucleic acid assembly. The project will help prioritize efforts within biotechnology governance, especially related to nucleic acid synthesis security and AI-enabled biology. | |
| Sep 2025 | Fourth Eon Bio | $109,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $109,000 to Fourth Eon Bio to improve function-based screening in the nucleic acid synthesis industry. They will create benchmark datasets of AI-generated sequences to test screening methods and evaluate AI models for predicting biological functions. In addition, they will facilitate conversations with nucleic acid synthesis providers, screening tool providers, the biological design tool community, and biosecurity experts to develop and integrate more robust function-based screening approaches capable of detecting engineered and AI-designed biological threats. Learn more | |
| Sep 2025 | Institute for Progress | $200,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided the Institute for Progress with $200,000 to support a fellowship focused at the intersection of AI and biosecurity policy. We expect this fellowship to strengthen risk assessment, mitigation, and governance approaches in the U.S. | |
| Sep 2025 | Epoch AI | $85,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided Epoch AI with an $85,000 grant to expand their database of biology AI models, with a focus on biological design tools, by tracking new releases and their technical specifications and safeguards. This builds on their 2024 work, which found that only a small fraction of these tools include adequate safeguards. The updated database will cover models released through August 2025 and identify high-risk applications. Epoch will also invest in automated tools to improve the efficiency of the Bio-AI Model Observatory’s data collection, analysis, and validation. We expect this database to support policymakers advocating for stronger oversight of dual-use biotechnologies. | |
| Aug 2025 | Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security | $226,344 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $226,344 to the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (CHS) for their work on nucleic acid synthesis governance, including research, policy development, and engagement with industry and policymakers. We expect that CHS’ research will clarify how synthesis screening policies can strengthen biosecurity while promoting the bioeconomy. We also expect that their outreach will increase awareness and understanding of nucleic acid synthesis security among key decision-makers in the U.S. and internationally. Visit partner website | |
| Aug 2025 | Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation | $132,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | In August 2025, Sentinel Bio provided $132,000 to the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation (CEPI) to promote the responsible development of and reduce biosecurity risks associated with CEPI’s Pandemic Preparedness Engine. The Pandemic Preparedness Engine is a global artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled vaccine design platform to support the 100 Days Mission, an initiative to develop vaccines against novel viral threats with epidemic or pandemic potential within 100 days of identification. The grant will enable CEPI to retain an AI/biosecurity expert who will design and implement biosecurity safeguards for the Engine, including managed access approaches that will help ensure safe, secure, and equitable access to this global capability. The AI/biosecurity expert will also support CEPI’s broader biosecurity policy development across its diverse vaccine research, development, and manufacturing portfolio, totaling $3.8B across 47 countries to date. We anticipate that the AI/biosecurity framework and mitigations developed through this partnership will support global norm and best practices development and serve as a model for other AI developers and networks that, like CEPI, are working to integrate biosecurity best practices as core components of their funding, research, results communication, and partnerships. | |
| Aug 2025 | MITRE Corporation | $188,421 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $188,421 to the MITRE Corporation to propose mechanisms for aggregating data across the nucleic acid synthesis industry. This effort aims to address the “split-order problem,” where nefarious actors might circumvent biosecurity protocols by ordering nucleic acid fragments that are short enough to fall below screening thresholds. We expect MITRE to compare different operating models for such a system, such as a government-mandated reporting system or an industry-led data-sharing initiative. We also expect this project to answer critical questions regarding the technical, legal, and operational prerequisites for a cross-provider data aggregation mechanism, such as how to securely share sensitive data with implications for customer privacy and intellectual property. | |
| Jul 2025 | International Gene Synthesis Consortium | $164,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $164,000 to the International Gene Synthesis Consortium to support the Sequence Biosecurity Risk Consortium (SBRC). Additionally, we have committed to matching industry contributions 1:1, up to an additional $175,000. The SBRC is a multistakeholder effort that brings together nucleic acid providers, screening tool developers, policymakers, AI companies, and scientific experts to develop detailed risk-classification standards for nucleic acid sequences, with the ultimate goal of enabling enforceable screening standards. We expect this grant to contribute to our broader goal of securing nucleic acid synthesis by laying the foundation for evidence-based and enforceable regulation. While the SBRC’s standards are initially intended for voluntary adoption by synthesis providers, they are designed to be practical, scalable, and policy-relevant and expected to inform and accelerate future regulatory uptake. | |
| Jul 2025 | International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science | $36,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $36,000 to the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) to support the work of the Sequence Biosecurity Risk Consortium (SBRC). Additionally, we have committed to matching industry contributions 1:1, up to an additional $175,000. The SBRC is a multi-stakeholder effort that brings together nucleic acid providers, screening tool developers, policymakers, AI companies, and scientific experts to develop detailed risk-classification standards for nucleic acid sequences, with the ultimate goal of enabling enforceable screening standards. We expect this grant to contribute to our broader goal of securing nucleic acid synthesis by laying the foundation for evidence-based and enforceable regulation. While the SBRC’s standards are initially intended for voluntary adoption by synthesis providers, they are designed to be practical, scalable, and policy-relevant and expected to inform and accelerate future regulatory uptake. | |
| Jul 2025 | Helena | $75,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | In July 2025, Sentinel Bio made a grant of up to $75,000 to the Helena Group Foundation to expand the team’s capacity to work on urgent biosecurity policy topics, including AIxBio and nucleic acid synthesis screening. We expect this work to support our efforts on policy translation in both of our critical strategic priority areas. | |
| Jun 2025 | Unknown Recipients | $110,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $110,000 to a biosecurity research team to identify potential ‘chokepoints’ for managing access to dual-use biotechnology capabilities. This study will review protocols in virology and reverse genetics to identify materials and equipment that are distinctly used in research with pandemic-capable viruses. The study will also assess contract research organizations (CROs) and cloud laboratories that enable people to outsource difficult steps in the construction of engineered biological threats. We expect this project to inform our internal prioritization between various biotechnology governance interventions and to provide an evidence base for the broader biosecurity field. | |
| Jun 2025 | SecureBio | $600,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided SecureBio with $600,000 to a) expand its AI×Bio risk evaluation capabilities from LLMs into Biological Design Tools, and b) develop its policy capacity to bridge the gap between technical findings and real-world safety improvements. We expect this grant to support our work on evidence-generation and policy translation. | |
| Jun 2025 | Center for Responsible Innovation | $23,500 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $23,500 in unrestricted support to the Center for Responsible Innovation. We expect this support to help CRI’s efforts to develop sound policies for biotechnology governance in the United States. | |
| May 2025 | Unknown Recipients | $1,025 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $1,025 to an independent biosecurity researcher to examine Australia’s import control system for synthetic nucleic acids, assessing its implications for biosecurity and the life sciences industry. We expect this research to inform how we think about global access controls for synthetic nucleic acids and other biological materials. | |
| May 2025 | Renaissance Philanthropy | $25,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | Sentinel Bio awarded a $25,000 grant to Renaissance Philanthropy to support their hosting of a workshop that will highlight biosecurity risks from emerging technologies and potential mitigation approaches. | |
| Apr 2025 | Unknown Recipients | $110,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $110,000 to a biosecurity research team to systematically map the nucleic acid synthesis industry. The project will assess the risk profile of different nucleic acid products, including custom and non-custom DNA of different types and lengths. The project will also map the global landscape of gene-length DNA synthesis providers and next-generation benchtop device manufacturers. This work will inform our geographic prioritization and help global nucleic acid governance efforts focus on the products that pose the highest security risks. | |
| Apr 2025 | Active Site | $600,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $600,000 to support a large-scale randomized controlled study examining whether frontier AI systems enable non-experts to perform expert-level biological tasks. This comprehensive wet lab study compares novice participants using AI assistance against a control group with internet-only access while completing multi-step laboratory procedures. The experiment aims to assess AI uplift capabilities in biological research, informing misuse risk assessments and model-level safeguards. Given the potential sensitivity of our findings, results will undergo pre-review by an independent advisory board of biosafety and national security experts before publication. We co-funded this effort with the Frontier Model Forum, an industry-supported non-profit organization dedicated to ensuring the safe and responsible development of frontier AI systems. | |
| Apr 2025 | Biosecurity Event at SynBioBeta | $2,500 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $2,500 to support a biosecurity event at the 2025 SynBioBeta Conference. We hope this event will bring together leading experts to assess the opportunities and risks of synthetic biology and explore solutions for mitigating the most pressing biosecurity challenges, including those related to nucleic acid synthesis. | |
| Feb 2025 | Centre for Long-Term Resilience | $400,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $400,000 to the Centre for Long-Term Resilience to advance its work on AI-enabled biology, allowing CLTR to further its risk analysis on narrow biological tools and to assess gaps in existing safety frameworks, with the goal of focusing and strengthening policy development efforts. Learn more Our support will also allow CLTR to rigorously assess the costs and benefits of screening measures for providers of synthetic nucleic acids. We expect this effort to create a robust evidence base to inform policy discourse in the United Kingdom and globally. | |
| Feb 2025 | Foreign Policy | $5,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $5,000 to support Foreign Policy’s Emerging Threats Forum at the 2025 Munich Security Conference. We hope this event will enable leading biosecurity experts to share and discuss evidence regarding emerging biological threats and increase global awareness of the solutions required to address them. Visit partner website | |
| Feb 2025 | Resilience Action Network International | $250,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided Resilience Action Network International (rani), a fiscally sponsored project of Panorama Global, with $250,000 to continue ongoing work on nucleic acid synthesis governance in Europe. This effort is led by Eloise Todd alongside a coalition of partners from civil society, academia, and industry, and in consultation with relevant regional and national government bodies. We expect this project to clarify potential mechanisms to govern nucleic acid synthesis at the EU- and national levels, lay the foundation for productive civil society engagement, and build a coalition of credible proponents for responsible biotechnology and life science governance in Europe. This grant follows our July 2024 support for the Resilience Action Network International. | |
| Jan 2025 | Asia Centre for Health Security | $75,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $75,000 to the Asia Centre for Health Security to expand Dr. Ayelet Berman’s research on nucleic acid governance in Asia. This effort maps the landscape of synthesis providers and regulatory mechanisms in select Asian countries, while building relationships between relevant stakeholders in civil society, industry, and policymakers. We expect this work will help clarify the path forward for implementing robust nucleic acid screening across Asia’s major life science hubs and identify opportunities for reducing the risks of biotechnology accidents and misuse in Asia and beyond. Visit partner website | |
| Nov 2024 | Council on Strategic Risks | $307,258 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | AI-Bio Policy Development We provided the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) with $307,258 to expand its capacity at the intersection of AI and biosecurity policy. This support will enable CSR to leverage its global biosecurity expertise to engage in timely discussions on this transformative issue. This effort aims to build bridges between technical and policy stakeholders while advancing concrete policy solutions that balance innovation with security concerns. Visit partner website | |
| Sep 2024 | University of Maryland – Department of Computer Science | $164,468 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided the University of Maryland with $164,468 for a fellowship to support biosecurity policy focusing on AI-Bio and nucleic acid governance. We expect this fellowship to strengthen biotechnology governance approaches in the U.S. and globally. Visit Partner Website | |
| Sep 2024 | Unknown Recipients | $286,619 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $286,619 to a biosecurity research team to assess how AI-based Biological Design Tools (BDTs) could increase biosecurity risks. The project partner will create a risk assessment framework that categorizes varying biological types by risk level and evaluates under which specific circumstances they might meaningfully advance concerning capabilities. We expect this work to close critical knowledge gaps about how AI-based tools contribute to biosecurity risks. The project aims to produce clear, accessible guides for policymakers and inform more targeted mitigation strategies. | |
| Aug 2024 | Unknown Recipients | $75,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $75,000 for a biosecurity researcher to research and develop a new system for validating the legitimacy of life science customers and streamlining biosecurity Know-Your-Customer practices. This work aims to increase the prevalence of high-quality customer screening while reducing administrative burden. The project is being carried out in consultation with leading providers of nucleic acid synthesis and biosecurity screening tools. We expect this project will advance frameworks for customer verification that balance security with scientific access. We also expect to explore the prospects of developing an end-to-end KYC service that could be taken up by an existing organization or launched as a standalone venture. | |
| Aug 2024 | Epoch AI | $80,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | AI-Bio Model Observatory We provided Epoch AI with $80,000 to systematically track the proliferation of bio-relevant frontier models and the adoption of biosecurity safeguards in these models over time. This research effort, led by Pablo Villalobos and David Atasanov, will establish a comprehensive baseline of biological sequence models, biological design tools, and frontier AI models, analyzing their incorporation of safety measures and risk mitigations. We expect this research project will help measure progress on implementing biosecurity safeguards for AI-Bio models, enabling evidence-based tracking of improvements in both the prevalence and quality of crucial safety measures. The observatory will provide invaluable data to inform policymakers and model developers about current gaps and opportunities in AI-Bio safety. Visit Partner Website | |
| Jul 2024 | Unknown Recipients | $1,800 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We commissioned a $1,800 qualitative study to research the political drivers of pandemic prevention. The project focuses on the factors that underpin political will for pandemic preparedness policies, such as the credibility of specific ideas and stakeholders. This work is led by an independent researcher and is based on interviews with a dozen academics, civil servants, and think tank leaders. We expect this research to inform our internal strategy for building the pandemic prevention ecosystem and our grantmaking in this area. | |
| Jul 2024 | Resilience Action Network International | $150,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | Roadmap for nucleic acid governance in Europe We provided Resilience Action Network International (rani), a fiscally sponsored project of Panorama Global, with $150,000 to research and develop a roadmap for nucleic acid governance policy in the European Union. This effort is led by Eloise Todd and is carried out in consultation with stakeholders in the biosecurity community, the nucleic acid synthesis industry, and contacts at relevant regional and national government bodies. We expect this project to clarify the potential mechanisms to govern nucleic acid synthesis at the EU- and national levels, lay the foundation for civil society advocacy, and build a coalition of credible proponents for responsible biotechnology and life science governance in Europe. | |
| Jun 2024 | Open Molecular Software Foundation | $50,000 | AI × bio, Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We provided $50,000 to the Open Molecular Software Foundation to support an inaugural biosecurity fellowship at Rosetta Commons, with Samuel Curtis as the inaugural fellow. This fellowship helps bridge the gap between cutting-edge molecular design research and biosecurity policy analysis. We expect this work will help build enduring connections between technical and policy communities, support the adoption of the Community Statement on Responsible AI in Protein Design, and improve our understanding of the impact of these emerging technologies in the broader biosecurity landscape. Visit Partner Website | |
| Jun 2024 | Engineering Biology Research Consortium | $330,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | Stress-testing synthesis screening systems We are working with the Engineering Biology Research Consortium (EBRC) on a $330,000 effort to develop and pilot a methodology for stress-testing (or ‘red-teaming’) systems for screening synthetic nucleic acid orders. This research effort is led by Dr. Becky Mackelprang, Dr. India Hook-Barnard, and postdoctoral researchers from the EBRC. The project is carried out in consultation with a larger number of organizations and individuals from the international biosecurity community, the gene synthesis industry, and contacts at relevant agencies in the United States government. We hope that this research will clarify existing gaps in nucleic acid governance, lay the scientific foundation for future auditing and accountability paradigms in the nucleic acid synthesis industry, and help us track our progress toward improving the prevalence and quality of global synthesis screening solutions. Visit partner website |
Grants via 2 · $1,826,000 · $913,000 average
| Date ↓ | Funder | Recipient | Via | Amount | Cause | Source | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 2025 | Unknown Donors | Asia Centre for Health Security | Sentinel Bio | $750,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We advised two external donors worried about future pandemics to support the Asia Centre for Health Security (Asia CHS) with a total of $750,000 to recruit leading talent, expand its research portfolio, and strengthen its operational foundation We expect this support will accelerate ACHS’s development into a well-respected regional institution that can effectively improve pandemic preparedness across Asia and bridge diverse health security perspectives from all over the world. Visit partner website Funding provided by an external partner at the recommendation of Sentinel Bio. |
| Nov 2024 | Unknown Donors | Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security | Sentinel Bio | $1,076,000 | Biosecurity | sentinel_bio | We advised an external donor worried about future pandemics to support the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (CHS) with $1,076,000 in general support to strengthen its pandemic prevention research and advocacy. We will work closely with CHS on efforts to safeguard advanced biotechnologies and bolster pandemic preparedness. This work is led by Dr. Tom Inglesby and Anita Cicero in collaboration with CHS’ team of scholars, research analysts, and support staff. We expect this grant will enable CHS to continue producing high-quality research that will meaningfully impact the broader pandemic prevention field, including its efforts to inform senior decision-makers in the US and internationally on specific policies that can substantially enhance resilience against pandemics and other biological risks. Visit partner website Funding provided by an external partner at the recommendation of Sentinel Bio. |